250 Years of American Compounding with Meb Faber

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Fire the Whole Investment Team: Meb Faber on 250 Years of American Compounding and Why CalPERS Can’t Beat a 60/40 allocation

A dollar invested in the U.S. stock market in 1800 is worth roughly $200 million today, and Meb Faber says the giant pension funds paid to beat that kind of compounding usually can’t. In this episode of Wealth Actually, Frazer Rice talks with Meb Faber, co-founder and CIO of Cambria Investment Management and host of The Meb Faber Show, about his new coffee-table book Investing in America: The Rise of a 250-Year Bull Market, the shareholder yield thesis behind Cambria’s ETF lineup, and his long-running public campaign arguing that CalPERS and other giant institutional pools routinely fail to beat a simple, low-cost buy-and-hold portfolio.

Key Takeaways

  • America is, in Faber’s words, the greatest compounding machine in history. He puts a dollar invested in U.S. stocks in 1800 at roughly $200 million today — a number he uses to reframe how clients should think about staying invested through wars, depressions, and pandemics.
  • The book’s origin story starts with meme stocks. Faber says COVID pulled a new generation of retail investors into the market through gamified trading apps, and he wanted to hand them a historically grounded alternative to day-trading and zero-day options.
  • Diversification is older than the country itself. Faber traces the concept back to 15th- and 16th-century joint-stock voyages — the Mayflower and the Virginia Company among them — where spreading capital across many risky expeditions let “merchant adventurers” survive when any single ship was lost.
  • Shareholder yield, not dividend yield, is Cambria’s core factor. Since the S&P 500’s dividend yield now sits near an all-time low of 1.04%, Faber argues the real signal is cash dividends plus net buybacks — net of the dilution from stock-based compensation that quietly erodes shareholders’ ownership every year.
  • Faber’s CalPERS critique boils down to one line: “the returns are not bad, they’re just not good.” He’s built an entire body of work, including Cambria’s ENDW endowment-style ETF, arguing that giant pools with virtually unlimited access to managers still can’t consistently beat a disciplined global 60/40.
  • Complexity is often the enemy, not the edge. Faber contrasts investing with almost every other field of expertise: hiring the best doctor or coach nearly always helps, but hiring the most sophisticated (and expensive) money manager frequently doesn’t.
  • Illiquidity has a way of showing up at the worst possible time. Faber points to endowments getting caught upside down in 2008–2009 and to more recent leveraged blowups as the same lesson repeating: over-lever a portfolio and you’re out of chips at the poker table.
  • The real accountability gap is career incentives, not investment theory. Faber contrasts Yale, which gets a pass for strong long-term results, with Harvard’s endowment, which he says has underperformed for two decades without anyone losing their job over it — a dynamic he says maps directly onto UHNW family governance.

Timestamps

  • [00:00] Cold open — CalPERS CIOs vs. UK prime ministers
  • [00:29] Show open and disclaimer
  • [00:54] Welcome: Meb Faber, Cambria, and the new book
  • [02:07] The $76 price tag and the 1776 joke
  • [03:13] Genesis of Investing in America: COVID, meme stocks, and joint-stock voyages
  • [06:33] The most surprising find: Ben Franklin’s “Mind Your Business” motto
  • [09:09] Argentina vs. the U.S. — what actually drove American exceptionalism
  • [12:47] Cambria today: the shareholder yield thesis
  • [17:46] Why politicians target buybacks instead of stock-based comp
  • [20:54] The CalPERS critique begins
  • [21:34] The Ivy Portfolio, the ENDW endowment ETF, and year-one results
  • [25:45] The Nevada pension comparison and the liquidity-complexity pushback
  • [26:56] Institutional blowups, Harvard’s endowment dysfunction, and misaligned incentives
  • [29:36] The “anti-Switzerland of asset management” bit
  • [31:16] Close: where to find Meb, Cambria, and the book

Pull Quotes

“No, no, no, no, Frazer — it is $76, in honor of 1776.” — Meb Faber

“A dollar would be worth roughly $200 million today… despite wars and depressions and pandemics and everything else terrible that’s happened in the history of the world, this relentless compounding is such a fun story.” — Meb Faber

“There are dividend funds in the U.S. today… whose actual dividend yield is lower than their management fee. A negative net dividend yield — an astonishing statistic in 2026.” — Meb Faber

“Who’s had more turnover in the past 10 years — CalPERS CIOs or UK prime ministers? Both totally dysfunctional. I think CalPERS has a slight edge, but it’s close.” — Meb Faber

“I’m the anti-Switzerland of asset management.” — Meb Faber

About the Guest

Meb Faber is co-founder, CEO, and Chief Investment Officer of Cambria Investment Management, an independent, privately owned advisory firm built around quantitative asset management and alternative investment strategies (BusinessWire). He hosts The Meb Faber Show, one of the most widely followed investing podcasts, and is the author of eight books, including The Ivy Portfolio, Global Asset Allocation, Global Value, Shareholder Yield, and now Investing in America: The Rise of a 250-Year Bull Market — his first coffee-table book, released to coincide with the U.S. semiquincentennial (Curzio Research). Proceeds from the book go to charities that fund investment accounts for Americans born in the country. A ninth book, The Awesome Portfolio, is slated for release on September 8, 2026 (Meb Faber on X).

Contact Meb Faber & Cambria

Cambria Funds Mentioned

  • Shareholder Yield suite (SYLD, FYLD, EYLD, plus small-cap and large-cap variants) — cash dividends plus net buybacks plus net debt reduction, divided by market cap (MarketWatch)
  • GVAL — Global Value ETF screening the cheapest quartile of roughly 45 country markets by long-term valuation (Cambria — GVAL)
  • TAIL / FAIL — U.S. and global ex-U.S. tail-risk ETFs pairing short-term Treasuries with a rolling ladder of out-of-the-money S&P 500 puts (Cambria — TAIL)
  • Trinity Portfolio (TRTY) — roughly half buy-and-hold, half trend-following across a basket of other Cambria funds (Cambria — Trinity Portfolio)
  • ENDW — Cambria’s endowment-style ETF, discussed on the show as roughly $150–180 million at launch and referenced later in conversation as having grown toward roughly $5 billion in assets with more than 100,000 investors (MebFaber.com)

The CalPERS Critique — Further Reading

Frequently Asked Questions

How much would a dollar invested in the U.S. stock market in 1800 be worth today?
Meb Faber says roughly $200 million, using the figure to illustrate how relentless compounding has powered through wars, depressions, and pandemics over the country’s history. It’s an illustrative, back-of-envelope estimate rather than a precise index calculation, since standardized stock indexes didn’t exist in 1800.

Why is Meb Faber’s new book priced at $76?
It’s a nod to 1776 and the country’s founding, timed to the U.S. semiquincentennial. All proceeds go to charities that fund investment accounts for Americans born in the country.

What is shareholder yield, and how is it different from dividend yield?
Shareholder yield is cash dividends plus net stock buybacks (net of new share issuance, particularly from stock-based compensation), divided by market cap. Faber argues it captures real capital return to shareholders better than dividend yield alone, especially now that the S&P 500’s dividend yield sits near an all-time low of about 1.04% and share buybacks have outpaced dividends every year since the late 1990s.

What is Meb Faber’s argument against CalPERS and other large pension funds?
Faber’s recurring claim is “the returns are not bad, they’re just not good” — that giant institutional pools with access to virtually any manager on the planet still fail to consistently beat a simple, low-cost, diversified buy-and-hold portfolio, once fees and complexity are accounted for. Cambria launched an endowment-style ETF (ENDW) partly to make this a live, ongoing comparison rather than a hypothetical one.

What is Cambria’s endowment-style ETF and how does it compare to institutions like CalPERS?
ENDW replicates a Yale/Swensen-style endowment allocation — global stocks, global bonds, and real assets like gold, TIPS, and REITs — in a low-cost ETF with an all-in expense under 25 basis points. Faber uses it as a running, real-time benchmark against actual endowment and pension performance reported each fiscal year.

Why does Meb Faber say complexity is often the enemy in investing?
Unlike most fields, where more resources and the best available experts reliably produce better outcomes, Faber argues that in investing, more complexity and more access to exotic managers frequently doesn’t translate into better returns net of fees — and often just adds cost and illiquidity risk.

What lesson does Meb Faber draw from institutional blowups and the 2008–2009 crisis?
Endowments that mark their portfolios only once a year got caught badly offsides in 2008–2009, with illiquid positions falling even further than public markets. Faber sees the same pattern recur whenever a fund over-levers and gets forced out of the game — a basic failure of position sizing and situational awareness that keeps repeating at the highest levels of finance.

Full Transcript

[00:00] Cold Open (produced VO): I said, who’s had more turnover in the past 10 years — CalPERS CIOs or UK Prime Ministers? Both totally dysfunctional. And I think CalPERS has a slight edge, but it’s close.

Meb Faber suggested that CalPERS should fire its entire investment team, and that complexity has become a major headwind to their ability to generate returns. Find out more on this episode of Wealth Actually. We’re also going to talk about Meb’s new book, which argues that America is one of the greatest compounding machines in the history of capitalism.

[00:29] Show Open (produced VO): Welcome back to the Wealth Actually podcast — the show that features experts, entrepreneurs, and commentators who give you the right knowledge, planning, and guidance so you can preserve your assets and enjoy your wealth. Learn more and subscribe today at WealthActually.com.

This podcast is for educational and entertainment purposes. It is not investment, legal, or tax advice. It does not represent the opinions of the employers of the host or guest.

[00:54] Frazer Rice: Welcome back. Meb Faber is on the show. He founded Cambria Investment Management, which is a $4 billion ETF group. He also has The Meb Faber Show and does a lot of different writing. He’s famous for being on Twitter and taking on CalPERS. But most importantly, he has a new book out talking about America as a great compounding machine. It’s a lot of fun to have him on.

Welcome aboard, Meb.

[01:16] Meb Faber: My man, great to be here.

Frazer Rice: Oh, thank you for being on. I thank you beforehand for including a piece of my writing in one of your old compendiums on best investment writing. I’ve never forgotten that, so thank you again.

Meb Faber: Well, good job making the cut.

Frazer Rice: Yeah, right, exactly. I passed the audition. Seen you a few times on The Idea Farm here and there over the years.

Meb Faber: Yep. As I tell people with my girlfriend, I met expectations in my recent review, so we’re onto the next year. Look, key to life, Frazer — investors, we’re in a bull market, everyone expects 15% returns forever. Key to investing in life: just low expectations. That’s it. Set your expectations low, and you’ll be pleasantly surprised every day. Don’t lose principal over time — that’ll get you pretty far in life.

[02:07] Frazer Rice: So anyway, you’ve got a new book out too, which I thought was pretty cool. I love the fact that you priced it at $17.76 and really focused on the—

Meb Faber: No, no, no, no, Frazer — it is $76, in honor of 1776. Now to be clear, we don’t make any money on this book. We’re donating all the proceeds to the Invest America charities that fund accounts for Americans born in this country — a wonderful charity, big supporters of it.

Frazer Rice: But yes, in honor of the country’s founding. This is why we have you all to make sure I get that stuff right. But the concept of America as the best compounding machine ever — I think that’s really interesting. First of all, what prompted you to get involved with putting this book together? You’ve written before — seems like you’ve been busy with other stuff, of course — but then you came back and decided this was a good topic to take on. What was the genesis of the book?

[03:13] Meb Faber: Yeah, so this is my eighth book, and the first coffee-table book we’ve ever done. People were saying, “What the hell, $76? Are you guys crazy?” Look — this is a beautiful 200-page book. There’s probably 70 pictures, charts, tables. And the concept is in the subtitle: Investing in America: The Rise of a 250-Year Bull Market.

And the origin story goes back to COVID. Nobody had anything to do — sports stopped, you couldn’t go to the beach. So people were sitting around, and Americans — look, they’re gamblers, they’re risk-takers, we know that. And I said, we can’t do anything about that. So this entire generation of young people turned their attention to the stock market, and we got meme stocks. Today that’s evolved into prediction markets and zero-day options and all sorts of other nonsense.

We wanted to grab those young people and say, “No, you don’t understand — the real story is better than any of this. You don’t have to day-trade. You don’t have to bet against the casino and lose.” So we said, let’s do this history since the founding of our republic — what it would have looked like if you could invest from 1800.

And the compounding math is so fantastical it seems wrong. A dollar invested in 1800 — and yes, I know there were no indexes back then, chill out, people — but just to be instructive, a dollar would be worth roughly $200 million today. The point is you get on this train despite wars and depressions and pandemics and everything else terrible that’s happened in the history of the world — despite all that, this relentless compounding is such a fun story.

On top of that — the founding of our country, and a lot of people don’t know this: when you learn the history of America in elementary school, you learn about the immigration, particularly from Europe, people escaping religious persecution, seeking a better life through freedom — the Mayflower, all that. All true. But what they leave out is that most of these explorations and voyages were funded by companies. Back then they called them joint-stock companies; today we call them companies, LPs, C-corporations — corps, right, partnerships. Because the reality, going back to the 15th century, is that if you’re sending a ship to the New World to find gold, that ship could sink, or there were pirates — you’d lose all your money.

So this brilliant invention we call diversification today has been around for hundreds and hundreds of years. These companies said, it’s risky to invest in one voyage, but you can own part of a company that invests in 10 or 20 or 30 of these, and maybe one of them will hit. That sounds like venture capital. They used to call these people “adventurers” or merchant adventurers. Hudson’s Bay, the Mayflower voyage, the Virginia Company — many of them failed, many didn’t make money, but some made spectacular profits. It’s a fun origin story that hasn’t really been told about these early entrepreneurs and risk-takers, who honestly still permeate our culture to this day.

[06:33] Frazer Rice: In putting the book together, what was the most surprising chart you found that you ended up including?

[06:41] Meb Faber: There’s a lot of fun historical statistics in the book. One of my favorite parts of writing it was buying — I don’t know, 50 or 100 financial history books I’d never heard of, books on financial crises globally from various markets. We just had an author on the podcast talking about the global financial crisis of 1873, and on and on — you learn so much.

One I love telling people, especially young people — my son or his friends — is: look at a dollar bill or a quarter, and I ask, what’s the motto on there? Well, that used to not be the motto. Ben Franklin, back in the day, the motto on the Fugio cent used to say “Mind Your Business” — which I thought was amazing. And it’s not “mind your business, kid” in the nosy sense — it’s more like, mind your (own) business. It had a sundial on it, too: time is short, mind your business. I thought, let’s go back to that — such a great motto.

A bunch of little fun stories, but to me one of the big takeaways of the book is: as a public stock investor, the news is always negative. You turn on CNBC, Bloomberg, pull up your phone, social media — negative, negative, negative, negative. It’s hard to sustain conviction. Look, we haven’t been through a big bear market in 17 years, but when you’re down 30%, 40%, 50%, and you’re reading “Lehman’s going under” and all these crazy headlines — the book lets you zoom out.

Each chapter zooms into a decade and then zooms back out and says, okay, 1930s, Great Depression, you lost 80% in stocks — but guess what, here’s your return over the next 50 years. Even over a 20-year period, large-cap stocks become less volatile than bonds, which is an amazing takeaway. Being able to zoom out and say, “I’m a long-term investor, why am I even concerning myself with day-to-day negativity” — that shift in mindset is really important, because when you zoom out, you can barely even see 1987 on a long-term chart of the stock market.

I think it’s a useful thing to send to clients, particularly at year-end if you’re a financial advisor. We’ve got big discounts if you buy 50 books online — send it to clients and say, hey, stop going crazy, this too shall pass.

[09:09] Frazer Rice: One thing I always have in my mind — I don’t remember if this is exactly true, but Argentina and the US were on roughly equal economic footing back around 1900. When you were putting this together, did you see anything in the US’s political climate or structure — the things that gave it tailwinds to go from 1900 through to now with this rocket-ship growth — versus a country like Argentina, similarly situated, that just muddled along economically? Was there anything in particular that you saw that codified American exceptionalism?

[09:51] Meb Faber: Yeah, you’ve got to remember, the US was an emerging market too, for a long period. We didn’t always hold the crown as the largest economy or the largest stock market in the world. The US is two-thirds of world market cap today — astonishing. But if you and I were sipping tea back in 1800 or 1900 and betting on what country would dominate the next century, you’d have gotten a whole host of different answers.

That’s part of the fun of this book — you realize, when things got started in Amsterdam in the 1600s, they held the crown, but not forever. It shifted to London, then eventually to New York. And in our own lifetimes, the US wasn’t always the largest stock market — Japan was, in the 1980s. It’s a useful construct: look how much things change. Not even just on a country level — sectors too. Go back 100 years and you’re like, wait, where are the tech stocks? It was railroads. Go back another 100 years and it’s, wait, where are the railroads? There weren’t any — it was banks and insurance. The constant is always change and creative destruction.

The big takeaway is you have to be an owner. This ownership mentality is particularly pervasive in the US. Talk to people in Sweden, Europe, Asia, Latin America — they own far fewer stocks than Americans do. Ask what they invest in, and it’s cash in the bank, real estate, maybe. There’s something in the water here. Same thing with entrepreneurship — talk to Americans about failure, and there’s no shame in it here. It’s almost celebrated; we cheer for it. The only thing we like seeing more than someone fail is their eventual rise after failure — the phoenix. There’s a lot of big takeaways in that.

It feels like the last 17 years, the US is just going to dominate forever. We wrote a paper called The Bear Market and Diversification a few years back about how special this period has been for US stocks, crushing everything else — but it’s not totally without precedent. In the last hundred years it’s happened three other times where 10-year rolling stock returns hit 15%: the 1920s (the Roaring Twenties), the Nifty Fifty period in the mid-20th century, and my favorite bull market, the late 1990s. And now again today — COVID, meme stocks, the AI boom, whatever you want to call it. Eventually the good times don’t last forever; you probably shouldn’t expect 15% returns to the moon. But pat yourself on the back and celebrate it — it’s been a very special run.

[12:47] Frazer Rice: Day-job-wise, at Cambria you’ve got a whole host of different investment theses that you build vehicles around. One that’s gotten my attention, and that I really like the idea of, is the shareholder yield concept — especially the global shareholder yield concept, for the reasons you just described, coming off a very long cycle of US exceptionalism in the stock market. I like the idea of cash flow as an indicator of good investment performance, and diversifying both within and outside the US. With an asterisk here that this is not investment advice, everyone — take us through what you’re thinking on that front, and what else you’re up to at Cambria that’s interesting in the investment ecosystem right now.

[13:35] Meb Faber: Sure. It’s kind of crazy, Frazer, but we hit our 20-year anniversary this year, which feels like just yesterday when I started the company. Some of the shareholder yield funds — we now have three with over a 10-year track record, and our oldest, SYLD, is a pesky teenager now. What do you expect out of teenagers? More volatility — hopefully up volatility, not down.

We wrote a book on this topic 10, 15 years ago, and a new second edition is out — it’s free online as an ebook, listeners, you can get it from the blog. The subtitle of the book is Shareholder Yield: A Better Approach to Dividend Investing — a pretty bold claim, given there are hundreds of dividend-type funds out there: dividend income, dividend growth, equity income, on and on. Our thesis was that there’s something the entire marketplace hadn’t noticed or appreciated: the rise of share buybacks. Starting in the late ’90s, share buybacks have outpaced dividend distributions in the United States every year. In fact, the US dividend yield on the S&P 500 is at an all-time low of 1.04% — it may cross below 1% for the first time ever, which is astonishing.

Our thesis was that a shareholder yield approach — simply cash dividends plus net stock buybacks — outperforms, historically, any dividend strategy you can construct. The “net” matters because it accounts for share issuance, particularly stock-based compensation to the C-suite, which is everywhere in the US — my home state of California’s tech companies love to “make it rain” with stock-based comp. The problem is the average US stock is a diluter: your ownership share goes down every year because they keep issuing more shares.

We’ve since demonstrated this in real time across SYLD, FYLD, EYLD (the emerging-market version), and now small-cap and large-cap variants — they’ve done exceptionally well. These funds effectively target a Buffett-like, value-and-quality approach: the average stock coming into the portfolios has roughly a double-digit shareholder yield. Let that sink in — there are dividend funds in the US today, ETFs and mutual funds, that claim to be high-yield or dividend-income funds whose actual dividend yield is lower than their management fee. A negative net dividend yield — an astonishing statistic in 2026.

In the US, that shareholder yield is mostly driven by buybacks. In foreign developed and emerging markets, it’s closer to 50-50 — those markets still have more of a culture of cash dividends, so you’ll see yields there closer to 5-6%. But that’s changing, and changing fast. We did a blog post recently calling the UK the “buyback capital of the world” — the UK, China, Japan, and a bunch of other countries have hockey-sticked higher on this. It’s spreading globally, this idea of corporate responsibility: “my stock’s at half of book value, maybe we should consider buybacks.”

There’s so much mythology around stock buybacks — we could do a whole podcast on it — and we try to tackle it in the book. Hopefully it’s like a red pill: once you take it, it’s hard to look at investing the same way again, because it feels like you were missing a major piece of the puzzle.

[17:46] Frazer Rice: How infuriating is it when the Warrens of the world take aim at buybacks? It feels like an economically illiterate, and certainly politically driven, approach to legislating. To put the clamps on a genuinely useful capital allocation tool — I just don’t understand it. You must look at that and want to shake people and say, you’re missing the point, and you’re not even really targeting the abuses that exist.

[18:20] Meb Faber: Well, I try not to be too dismissive of our lovely politicians — the joke I always make is, don’t look down on them, they weren’t taught finance and investing in school either. We don’t teach money and investing in school, and that’s sort of my white whale — I think we should be teaching it as early as elementary school, just basic classes on money. The good news is, roughly a quarter to a third of high schools are now requiring at least one class on the topic.

What they’re actually targeting, I think somewhat thoughtfully underneath it, is executive compensation and stock issuance — which is the crazy part, because buybacks are the flip side of that. If a company is consistently loading up its CEO with options and diluting shareholders, and using buybacks to mop that dilution up — that’s what they’re really targeting, but it’s not the buyback itself. It’s the stock-based comp. Buybacks are the exhaust; that happens down the road.

The cool part about our methodology is we’re only targeting companies trading at something like 80 cents on the dollar. Buffett is my favorite example here — Berkshire has never paid a dividend, and you might think that’s crazy, but he understands this better than anyone. He’s been writing about buybacks since the 1980s. There’s a great quote from an old Berkshire annual report where he says there’s no better use of cash than buying back your own shares when they’re trading below intrinsic value. Berkshire has bought back a ton of stock over the past several years — smart — they say they’ll buy back at 1.2 times book or below and run a valuation screen.

There’s a great, somewhat surprising, takeaway in the book: there’s a myth that CEOs are megalomaniacs who just buy back stock whenever they think it’s expensive or cheap, but if you model it out historically, companies doing big buybacks (say, to retire 5% of market cap) tend to trade at a valuation discount to the market, and companies doing share issuance tend to trade at a valuation premium. There’s a real valuation arbitrage going on — CEOs aren’t dummies. That’s part of what you’re capturing with a shareholder yield approach, as long as it’s consistently recycled. And remember, a buyback is optional — there has to be someone willing to sell into it, so there are always two sides.

[20:54] Frazer Rice: Let’s talk about one of my favorite parts of your persona, honestly — your fun critique of CalPERS and what large institutions do (and don’t do well) in managing money, and the inefficiencies that creep in with these big pools of capital as implementation and asset allocation get very complicated and very expensive. Walk me through your thinking when you first noticed the CalPERS phenomenon, and a bit of the history there.

[21:34] Meb Faber: My very first book was called The Ivy Portfolio, and we looked at how top endowments manage their assets — Yale, the late David Swensen. One of the strange things about our world in asset management — almost unique among industries — is the assumption that more resources, more money, more access automatically equals better results. That’s true in almost every other endeavor: get the best doctor, you’re probably better off than with your local doctor; best trainer, best nutritionist, best coach, on and on. Not necessarily true in investing. The longer I’ve been in this business, the more I see complexity as often an enemy.

So we love to pick on CalPERS — we’ve written a dozen articles: should CalPERS be run by a robot, should they just fire everyone and buy ETFs? We’ve run the simulations, and in many cases these giant institutions — with $500 billion, hundreds of employees, access to literally any fund on the planet — should be able to beat everyone, but they can’t. A very basic buy-and-hold portfolio can mimic what a lot of these top institutions actually deliver.

Eventually I got tired of just talking about it. I’ve applied for the CalPERS CIO job at least half a dozen times — they have an opening every other year, listeners, it’s the most dysfunctional organization. I joked on Twitter the other day: who’s had more turnover in the past 10 years, CalPERS CIOs or UK prime ministers? Both totally dysfunctional — I think CalPERS has a slight edge, but it’s close. I said I’d do the job for free — I’d fire almost everyone and get rid of all the illiquid, high-fee investments. But there’s this entire ecosystem of people incentivized to keep the engine running: private equity consultants and the rest of the “two-and-20” crowd.

So eventually we said, let’s make this a real, live contest. We launched an endowment-style ETF, ENDW — roughly $150-180 million in it now — and said every June 30th, once we’re through a fiscal year, we’re going to compare results head-to-head. This ETF has no management fee to speak of, all-in under 25 basis points. Can you beat a low-cost ETF like that? Let’s find out.

Sure enough, year one — CalPERS has already reported, and they didn’t do badly, but it was basically like a 60/40 portfolio; you’d have been just as well off doing 60/40 and moving on. Our endowment-style allocation actually replicates the average endowment quite well — a nice global mix of global stocks, global bonds, and global real assets (gold, TIPS, REITs, and so on — that real-assets sleeve is one a lot of people leave out). To get closer to a Swensen-level result, you need a couple more ingredients, in my view: you can approximate something like private equity with small-cap value, and approximate the broader endowment risk profile with a bit of leverage, plus tilts to value, global exposure, and trend-following.

We’ll see how year one shakes out once all the endowments report — UNC might actually beat us because they had a huge stake in SpaceX, so congrats to Chapel Hill. But I think year one goes to me, sorry to say, CalPERS. I’m going to be a giant irritant on this for years to come. The cool thing is you now have a genuinely investable benchmark. Every endowment investment committee suddenly has to ask, with real fiduciary teeth: can we beat this low-cost ETF? And if we can’t, what are we even doing — why are we studying all these crazy illiquid partnerships instead of just buying a basket of ETFs and calling it a day? That’s going to be an awkward conversation in a lot of boardrooms.

[25:45] Frazer Rice: Two comments on that. First — isn’t there someone in the state of Nevada doing something similar, basically running one of the state pension pools with a team of about three people?

[25:51] Meb Faber: Yes — we had him on the podcast. I told him, look, you’re putting your money where your mouth is on this. I won’t do his story justice here, I’ll tell you about it off-air — but it’s a great example that this doesn’t have to be as hard as people make it out to be.

Frazer Rice: The second thing is — anytime I’ve talked to people in the industry about this, they come back and say, “yes, we technically have an infinite investing horizon, but we have very rigid liquidity needs, so we need to be complex, because our liquidity needs can shift at any moment.” Meanwhile, on one hand I’m thinking, that complexity doesn’t actually help you with liquidity, as far as I can tell — and on the other, it feels like a bit of a convenient excuse. Do you have a response to that?

[26:56] Meb Faber: Oh boy, I’ve got a bunch. The endowments famously got caught upside-down in 2008-2009. They only mark their portfolios once a year, June 30th — I wish we could all do that; maybe we should just tell clients, you’re only allowed to look once a year. They were probably down roughly half in ’08-’09, and the illiquid positions were probably down even more. A lot of them got badly offsides, and I don’t think many of them have fully learned the lesson — if you look at the amount of private allocations still sitting in a lot of these portfolios today, it’s a massive amount. I hope they’ve learned the lesson. We’ll see.

But it’s a story as old as time — we just saw a version of it recently with a fund blowup, a basic, one-oh-one level failure of situational awareness and position sizing: you over-lever a portfolio, you get taken out of the game, you lose all your money, and then you’re out of chips at the poker table. You watch these mistakes happen at the upper echelons of finance and wonder how it’s still happening — and the core problem is that the career incentives of the people running the money don’t necessarily match the actual investment problem.

Yale gets a pass. When Swensen’s successors hit a rough patch, how long do they get a pass? Because Harvard has been a total mess for the last 20 years — there are entire books written about the Harvard endowment, which used to be the Yale before Yale. The Harvard Crimson ran article after article saying, you’re overpaying people, what’s going on here — and the fund would underperform and nobody would actually lose their job over it. That’s the real problem, and I have some sympathy for how hard it is to fix.

You deal with a version of this on the personal client side too, with multigenerational wealth — it’s almost an unsolvable structural problem for a Harvard, an endowment, or a CalPERS, because — take Harvard — you’ve got current students, alumni, future students, professors, the people who work at the endowment itself, all with completely different incentives and interests. It creates a genuinely absurd situation where, in no realistic scenario, should the resulting portfolio look like what they actually end up with. It’s an outright disaster, structurally.

[29:36] Frazer Rice: It reminds me of a car designed by committee — you end up with this stitched-together Frankenstein’s monster of a product that was never going to work or sell, and it ends up sinking the company.

Meb Faber: Yeah, yeah — a Rube Goldberg machine is not what you need. But there’s a reason our endowment ETF, out of the roughly 20 funds we’ve launched, has gotten the least attention — even though it’s now about $5 billion in assets with over a hundred thousand investors. It’s received the least publicity of any ETF we’ve ever done, because it doesn’t benefit anyone in that whole existing ecosystem — it’s actually a genuine threat to it.

I was at an institutional conference up in Santa Barbara, at a wine happy hour, talking to three women who run three of the most famous pension and endowment pools of real money in the country. We’d just launched an endowment-style ETF, and they just stared back at me with these icy daggers. I said, oh, sorry — I’m not really a competitor to you, you should easily be able to beat me, I’m just the table stakes. But I think they realized that’s probably not true — they’re going to have a very hard time beating me, which doesn’t exactly make me anyone’s friend. I’m the anti-Switzerland of asset management.

[31:16] Frazer Rice: Meb, how do people find the firm, find the book, find you?

[31:24] Meb Faber: With a name like Meb, it’s easy. Cambria Funds is the day job, with the ETFs. Meb Faber is the old blog, podcast, and Twitter presence — you can find that just about anywhere. And if you find yourself in Los Angeles, Manhattan Beach, come say hi. We’d love to hear from you if you pick up a copy of the book, Investing in America — let us know what you think.

Frazer Rice: Really cool stuff. Thanks, Meb, for being on. This was a blast — let’s do it again.

Meb Faber: Let’s do it.

[31:50] Close (produced VO): This podcast is for educational and entertainment purposes. It is neither investment, legal, nor tax advice. It does not represent the opinions of the employers of the host or guests.

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